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Hightower: Water Rights

A NEW RULE OF LAW FOR THE
ABANDONMENT OF WATER RIGHTS
Elaine M. Hightower
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Montana Water Use Act of 19731 substantially revised the
law pertaining to abandonment of water rights. The Montana Legislature provided that the new statutory provisions would apply
only to those rights appropriated after 1973 and those rights decided in the adjudication process established by the Act.' Any appropriation acquired prior to the enactment of the Act was to be
determined by application of prior case law and statutes repealed
by the 1973 Act.'
The contested water rights in 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch4 were
appropriated prior to 1973. In its holding, the Montana Supreme
Court significantly departed from prior case law, and both redefined the element of intent needed to establish abandonment and
shifted the burden of proof.
This note reviews Montana law as it stood prior to 1973, discusses the changes implemented by the Montana Legislature, and
analyzes the extent and future impact of the Montana Supreme
Court's decision in 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch.
II.

CASE LAW PRIOR TO THE WATER USE ACT OF

1973

Prior Montana case law has consistently required two elements to prove abandonment: (1) nonuse of the appropriation,5
and (2) an intent to abandon.6 The court has repeatedly held that
abandonment by the appropriator must be voluntary,7 and has applied the Bouvier's Law Dictionary definition of abandonment:
"Abandonment must be made by the owner, without being pressed
by any duty, necessity, or utility to himself, but simply because he
1.
2.

Montana Water Use Act, ch. 452, 1973 Mont. Laws 1121.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-404(3) (1983).

3. Id.
4. Mont. , 666 P.2d 215 (1983).
5. Nonuse is defined as "relinquishment of possession." Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161,
167, 213 P. 597, 599 (1923).
6. Musselshell Valley Farming and Livestock Co. v. Cooley, 86 Mont. 276, 283 P. 213
(1929); St. Onge v. Blakely, 76 Mont. 1, 245 P. 532 (1926); Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161,
213 P. 597 (1923); Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19 P. 571 (1888).
7. St. Onge v. Blakely, 76 Mont. 1, 14, 245 P. 532, 536 (1926); Thomas v. Ball, 66
Mont. 161, 167, 213 P. 571, 599 (1923).
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*"8
desires no longer to possess the thing .
Intent to abandon, a question of fact,' is the more difficult element to prove. Historically, the burden of proof must be met by a
preponderance of the evidence and has fallen upon the party attempting to prove the abandonment. 10 In Thomas v. Ball" the
court emphasized that once an appropriation has been perfected,
the courts must exercise extreme care before declaring abandonment of the appropriation. 1 2 Periods of nonuse up to thirty years
have been found not to prove an intent to abandon.' 3 Long periods
of nonuse have been held to be "potent evidence""' of the intent to
abandon, but nothing more.
The court in past holdings declared abandonment of an appropriation based on nonuse only where: (1) the land itself was also
abandoned;'" (2) the party left the property to be taken by another
person;' 6 (3) there was no beneficial use of the water right for a
long period of time because the appropriator was using another
water source;' 7 or (4) the water right was not appurtenant to the
land and there was no use of the water for a long period of time. 18
In contrast, if the property had not been abandoned"s or if some

8. Middle Creek Ditch Co. v. Henry, 15 Mont. 558, 39 P. 1054, 1058 (1895). The court
has also held that when a party has left "the property to be taken by any other person,"
then an intention to abandon can be inferred. Featherman v. Hennessy, 42 Mont. 535, 54041, 113 P. 751, 753 (1911).
9. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-802 (1947) (repealed 1973).
10. Shammel v. Vogl, 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103 (1964); Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont.
161, 213 P. 597 (1923).
11. 66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597 (1923).
12. Id. at 167, 213 P. at 599.
13. Shammel v. Vogl, 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103 (1964) (nonuse of water rights for
30 years); St. Onge v. Blakely, 76 Mont. 1, 245 P. 532 (1926) (nonuse for a period of 12
years); Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597 (1923) (nonuse for essentially 20 years);
Moore v. Sherman, 52 Mont. 542, 159 P. 966 (1916) (nonuse for 12 years); Smith v. Hope
Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 45 P. 632 (1896) (nine years of nonuse); Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont.
225, 19 P. 571 (1888) (eight years of nonuse).
14. Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 438, 45 P. 632, 634 (1896).
15. Head v. Hale, 38 Mont. 302, 100 P. 222 (1909) (owner died and left no heirs or
successors to his land or the attached water right).
16. Featherman v. Hennessy, 42 Mont. 535, 113 P. 751 (1911).
17. O'Shea v. Doty, 68 Mont. 316, 320, 218 P. 658, 659 (1923).
18. Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher County Newlan Creek Water Dist., 185 Mont.
409, 605 P.2d 1060 (1980). The Thorsons' right was partly appurtenant and partly unattached. When a water right has been applied to a beneficial use, it then becomes appurtenant to the land upon which it has been applied. The unattached right must be applied to a
beneficial use within a reasonable amount of time. Pitsch, - Mont. at -, 666 P.2d at
222 (1983) (Ettien, D.J., dissenting); Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154, 177-78, 122 P. 575,
583 (1912).
19. In Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19 P. 571 (1888), the person claiming the water
right left the state for 11 years, but came back to claim his property once again. The court
in Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 45 P. 632 (1896), pointed to the upkeep of the
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use of the water had been made, regardless of the purpose, 0 the
court held against abandonment.

III.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE WATER USE ACT OF

1973

The Montana Legislature, in 1973, provided that a party owning a water right with a priority date before July 1, 1973, must file
a claim of his right with the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation (Department) before June 30, 1983.2' Failure to file
such a claim establishes a conclusive presumption of abandonment. 2 An appropriator can either abandon his right by intending
to cease its use or create a prima facie presumption of abandonment by nonuse for a period of ten successive years during which
available water exists.2 The burden of proof is on the Department
to establish abandonment by a preponderance of the evidence.2
Both the Department and a junior appropriator have standing to
assert abandonment by petitioning for abandonment in the same
district court that earlier determined the appropriation right.2
IV.
A.

79

RANCH, INC. V. PITSCH

Facts and Procedure

Vandervoort, Pitsch, and 79 Ranch, the parties to this action,
owned land adjacent to Big Coulee Creek in Golden Valley County,
Montana. Vandervoort's land lay downstream and Pitsch's land
mine to indicate both the property and the water right had not been abandoned.
20. Both in Shammel v. Vogl, 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103 (1964), and Thomas v. Ball,
66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597 (1923), some use of the water had been made.
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-221, -222 (1983). Together, these statutes exempt
"[c]laims for existing rights for livestock and individual as opposed to municipal domestic
uses based upon instream flow or groundwater sources and claims for rights in the Powder
River Basin" already filed.
22. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-226 (1983).
23. MOT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-404 (1983) provides:
(1) If an appropriator ceases to use all or a part of his appropriation right with the
intention of wholly or partially abandoning the right or if he ceases using his appropriation right according to its terms and conditions with the intention of not
complying with those terms and conditions, the appropriation right shall, to that
extent, be deemed considered abandoned and shall immediately expire.
(2) If an appropriator ceases to use all or part of his appropriation right or ceases
using his appropriation right according to its terms and conditions for a period of
10 successive years and there was water available for his use, there shall be a
prima facie presumption that the appropriator has abandoned his right in whole
or for the part not used.
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-405(2) (1983).
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-405(1) (1983).
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upstream from that of 79 Ranch.2 6 In 1977, the creek held insufficient water to meet the needs of the parties and this action
followed.
Both Eugene Schaff, operator of 79 Ranch, and Pitsch traced
their respective water rights to those appropriated by the Montana
Cattle Company, their predecessor in interest. The Montana Cattle
Company, however, ceased use of these rights in 1911 or 1913.28
Evidence indicated that neither Pitsch, Eugene Schaff, nor their
immediate predecessors knew of these water rights when they filed
subsequent notices of appropriation in 1973.29
Pitsch also claimed water rights established by Claude Hill
and Bert Schaff, his predecessors in interest. Hill had filed two notices of appropriation but did not follow the statutory requirements. A few of these acres were irrigated in the 1920's but the
evidence did not show the purpose or the extent of use.30 Bert
Schaff had filed a subsequent notice of appropriation in 1973; he
never used the water, however, because he failed to complete his
sprinkler system due to a lack of the necessary parts. Pitsch later
began irrigation after installment of a new sprinkler system in
1976.31 Eugene Schaff commenced irrigation in 1973, the same year
he filed his notice of appropriation. 2 Vandervoort's water rights
extended from 1902 onwards. 3
Vandervoort and 79 Ranch brought this action to enjoin
Pitsch's use of the Big Coulee Creek water, and to determine the
parties' respective water rights. The district court found that both
Pitsch and 79 Ranch had abandoned the water rights appropriated
by the Montana Cattle Company, and Pitsch had further abandoned the water rights claimed by Hill due to the fact that the
water had not been used for at least forty years and perhaps as
long as sixty years. Pitsch and 79 Ranch appealed from that judgment, the Montana Supreme Court remanded," and the district
26. Pitsch, __
Mont. at -,
666 P.2d at 216.
27. Id. at , 666 P.2d at 217.
28. Id. This land was irrigated by a series of ditches.
29. Id. at -,
666 P.2d at 219.
30. Id. at -,
666 P.2d at 217.
31. Id. at -,
666 P.2d at 216. Schaff filed a notice of appropriation for 30 cubic feet
per second of water.
32. Id. at -,
666 P.2d at 216-17.
33. Id. at -'
666 P.2d at 217. Vandervoort's water rights depended on notices of
appropriation for 1000 miner's inches in 1902, 100 miner's inches in 1909, 320 miner's inches
in 1925 and 300 miner's inches in 1926.
34. 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch, - Mont. , 631 P.2d 690 (1981), appeal after remand,_ Mont. , 666 P.2d 215 (1983).
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court reentered the prior judgment.3 5 Pitsch and 79 Ranch once
again appealed.
B.

The Court's Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
finding of abandonment. The court held that forty years of nonuse
"is strong evidence of an intent to abandon the water rights ...
[S]uch a long period of continuous nonuse raises the rebuttable
presumption of an intention to abandon, and shifts the burden of
proof onto the nonuser to explain the reasons for nonuse."3 Although the court purported to recognize "an approach for the determination of abandonment of water rights consistent with the
express intent of our legislature,""7 it actually ignored this intent.
For ninety-five years the Montana courts have ruled that nonuse
alone cannot establish abandonment of an appropriation,"8 and
that a party claiming abandonment has the burden of proof.3 9 The
1973 Water Use Act provides for the adjudication of all water
rights claimed before July 1, 1973, to be determined under the
statutory and case law applicable prior to that time.'0 The court
ignored this directive of the legislature. By holding that a showing
of nonuse for a long period of time raises a rebuttable presumption
of an intent to abandon and shifts the burden of proof onto the
nonuser, "' the court effectively overruled prior Montana case law
on water rights abandonment.
C.

Application of the New Rule

The court in Pitsch set forth a general guideline, adopted from
35. Pitsch, Mont. , 666 P.2d at 216. The district court entered scant findings
and established the following water rights and priorities:
(a) Vandervoort-50 inches for use on W Section 23-6N-21E., with priority date
as of June 1, 1924.
(b) 79 Ranch-45 inches for use on SWIA Section 25-5N-19E., with priority date
as of June 13, 1973.
(c) Pitsch-68 inches for use on Section 35-5N-19E., with priority date as of July
1, 1976.
36. Id. at
, 666 P.2d at 218.
37. Id. at -'
666 P.2d at 219.
38. Thomas, 66 Mont. at 168, 213 P. at 600. In Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont.
432, 438, 45 P. 632, 634 (1896), the court found nonuse to be merely "potent evidence of
abandonment, nothing more." In Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher County Newlan Creek
Water Dist., 185 Mont. 409, 605 P.2d 1060 (1980), the court held only the unattached water
right to be abandoned by nonuse, not the appurtenant right.
39. Thomas, 66 Mont. at 168, 213 P. at 597.
40. MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-404 (1983).
41. Pitsch, Mont. at , 666 P.2d at 218.
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other jurisdictions, concerning the proof needed to rebut the presumption of abandonment.4 2 "To rebut the presumption of abandonment, there must be established some fact or condition excusing long periods of nonuse, not merely expressions of desire or
hope. ' 43 Applying this broad standard to the specific facts in
Pitsch the Montana Supreme Court held that an excuse of insufficient funds to complete a sprinkler system did not rebut the presumption of abandonment." The court quoted In re C F & I Steel
Corp.,45 a Colorado case, which labeled such economic excuse a
"gleam-in-the-eye philosophy. ' 46
The Montana Supreme Court gave no further guidance as to
the application of this new rule of law to future cases. Two issues
must be considered: What constitutes an unreasonable period of
nonuse? What evidence must be shown to overcome this
presumption?
The Montana Supreme Court indicated its support of the
Water Use Act of 1973, and its wish to approach case law with the
Act in mind.47 According to the Act, nonuse for ten successive
years creates a presumption of abandonment.4 8 In light of the
court's recognition of the Act, ten years of nonuse offers a reasonable guideline and will most likely create a presumption of abandonment in future Montana cases even though the Act's ten-year
presumption was specifically meant to apply only to those water
rights appropriated after 1973.
Cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Montana Supreme
Court require proof of abandonment by "clear and convincing" evidence.'9 Montana case law, however, has traditionally demanded
only proof of abandonment by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0
Apparently the Montana court still demands proof only by a preponderance of the evidence, since in quoting cases from other jurisdictions it omitted any language referring to "clear and convincing" evidence."'
In the 1966 Colorado case of Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch and
42. The court referred to Colorado, South Dakota, and Texas case law.
43. Pitsch, Mont. at , 666 P.2d at 218.
44. Id. at , 666 P.2d at 218-19.
45. 183 Colo. 135, 515 P.2d 456 (1973).
46. Id. at 140, 515 P.2d at 458.
47. Pitsch, Mont. at -,
666 P.2d at 219.
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-404 (1983).
49. Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch and Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966).
In City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), the court stated that
the party must prove abandonment by clear and satisfactory evidence.
50. Thomas, 66 Mont. at 168, 213 P. at 600.
51. Pitsch, Mont. at , 666 P.2d at 218.
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Reservoir Co.,5 2 the court found a rebuttable presumption of abandonment. The appropriator overcame this presumption by showing
that during the course of nonuse it continued to keep its water
system in repair even though it lacked sufficient funds to make the
system wholly usable. The state of dilapidation resulted from
financial difficulties and a shortage of engineers and materials during World War II." The Colorado court held that "a reasonable
justification for non-use may very well exist where it can be shown
that economic, financial or legal difficulties or natural calamities"
caused the nonuse."
The Colorado court later distinguished C F & I Steel from
Hallenbeck. The petitioner in C F & I Steel argued that, since over
time it had made several surveys to determine the economic feasibility of once again using the appropriation, there was never an
intent to abandon the water right. The court disagreed. Petitioner
had not only failed to maintain its water system, but also failed to
use the appropriation for fifty-four years.5 5 The presumption of
abandonment was not rebutted.
Respondents in Beaver Park Water, Inc. v. City of Victor 6
rebutted the presumption of abandonment. The Colorado court
enumerated the relevant factors. The company's officers testified
that there was never an intent to abandon; that the water station
could be made operational within thirty days; that during the period of nonuse there was adequate water from another supply; and
that the company also leased the water right as an emergency
source, mortgaged its interest in the water right, and attempted to
negotiate its sale.57 Together these factors showed sufficient intent
not to abandon the appropriation.
In the case law prior to the court's decision in Pitsch, the
Montana Supreme Court referred to circumstances that could be
offered as an excuse for the long period of nonuse. Those circumstances include upkeep of the property used in conjunction with
the contested appropriation, 8 intermittent periods of use, 59 and
varying contract obligations premised on the appropriation.6
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
161, 213
60.

160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966).
Id. at 568, 420 P.2d at 426.
Id. at 567, 420 P.2d at 426.
C F & I Steel, 183 Colo. at 139, 515 P.2d at 458.
Colo. -,
649 P.2d 300 (1982).
Id. at , 649 P.2d at 302-03.
Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 45 P. 632 (1896).
Shammel v. Vogl, 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103 (1964); Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont.
P. 597 (1923); Moore v. Sherman, 52 Mont. 542, 159 P. 966 (1916).
Smith v. Hope Mining Co., 18 Mont. 432, 45 P. 632 (1896).
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These same factors can in the future contribute to rebuttal of the
presumption of an intent to abandon. The court has nonetheless
left the appropriator with a vague standard to be defined by future
case law.
V.

SUMMARY

A required showing of intent to abandon beyond mere nonuse
was an entrenched rule of Montana case law overruled in Pitsch.
Technically the holding of Pitsch contravenes legislative intent.
The legislature intended for rights appropriated prior to 1973 to be
adjudicated in accordance with the now repealed statutes and prior
case law. 6 ' Prior Montana case law has never hinted at a presumption of abandonment and consequent shifting of the burden of
proof.
Appropriators in Montana have relied upon this body of case
law and, in accordance with the Water Use Act of 1973, have filed
claims of right for their appropriations. 2 If appropriators had been
aware of this new rule, they might have taken the necessary steps
to aintain their water rights and rebut such a presumption. Presently, an appropriator's water rights are at the mercy of an unclear
and ill-defined rule of law.
Because water is a precious commodity,"' a basic underlying
premise of water law is the need to apply all water to a beneficial
use."4 Recognizing this principle, the Colorado courts have consistently found a rebuttable presumption of abandonment after an unreasonably long period of nonuse.6 In the same light, the Montana
Supreme Court in Pitsch makes an effort to assure present use of
all water.
Rebutting a presumption of abandonment requires affirmative
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-404(3) (1983) provides: "This section does not apply to
existing rights until they have been determined in accordance with part 2 of this chapter."
In his dissent District Judge Ettien, sitting by designation, stated: "To me, it is clear the
legislature wanted the status quo on pre-July 1, 1973, water law to be maintained until
water rights were established under the 1973 Act." Pitsch, Mont. at -, 666 P.2d at
222. (Ettien, D.J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Justice Weber, in his concurring opinion, referred to Shammel v. Vogl, 144 Mont.
354, 362, 396 P.2d 103, 107 (1964), which states, "[t]he loss of a water right.., is a serious
occurrence in Montana and other semi-arid western states." Pitsch, - Mont. at , 666
P.2d at 220 (Weber, J., concurring).
64. In C F & I Steel, 183 Colo. at 140, 515 P.2d at 458, the court recognized "the large
demands for all of the appropriatable water in this state and the consequent high value of
water. . ....

65. Beaver Park Water, Inc. v. City of Victor, - Colo. , 649 P.2d 300 (1982); In
re C F & I Steel Corp., 183 Colo. 135, 515 P.2d 456 (1973); Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch and
Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/8

8

1984]

Hightower: Water Rights

WATER RIGHTS

175

proof of intent not to abandon. Stale and unused rights will be
eliminated, and present users will be assured of the right to use
their appropriations without fear of an unused claim later assuming priority. Certainty will be injected into the system now, rather
than after the present adjudication process is complete. In Pitsch,
the court ruled in favor of assured application of water to a present
beneficial use, rather than relying on prior case law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court has propounded a new rule of
law. It has overruled past case law in opposition to legislative intent. Eventually both the legislature and the courts would be wise
to enforce such a rebuttable presumption of an intent to abandon
due to long and continuous nonuse. This should only be done,
however, in conjunction with the intent of the Montana
Legislature.
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